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The present objective will be to identify the distinguishing
features of the movement paying special attention to its
theory and methodology. The focus on theory and
methodology imports an assumption, which should be made
explicit, that the long-term viability of the movement and
the potential for its application to the politics of law
depends upon its attaining and sustaining a degree of
theoretical and methodological coherence.
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* Professor of Law and Criminology, Law and Society (by courtesy),
Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, and Co-Director, Center on
Law, Equality and Race (CLEaR), University of California, Irvine, School of Law;
LL.M., University of Wisconsin; BA, JD, University of California, Berkeley. Many
thanks to the individuals who greatly enhanced this project through their support,
insights, comments, or body of work: Sameer Ashar, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Devon
Carbado, Robert Chang, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Laura G6mez, Ian Haney-L6pez, Angela
P. Harris, Mona Lynch, Elizabeth Mertz, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Osagie Obasogie,
Daria Roithmayr, Shauhin Talesh (and his Spring 2016 Interdisciplinary Studies of Law
class), Geoff Ward, Tukufu Zuberi, and especially, Tonya Brito and Kaaryn Gustafson.
Thank you also to Tanya Taylor for her excellent research assistance and the Wisconsin
Law Review, especially Cameron Marston, for inviting me to give a keynote address
and the wonderful editing they provided.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, I published one of my first law review articles as a legal
academic, "Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating
the Power of Narrative."2 The article explored the particular ways that
one's social identity may inform how one is treated within the criminal
justice system. At the center of the article was a story about my
maternal grandmother, who had been arrested as an accessory to
murder in 1968.' The article sought to demonstrate how her individual
identity was largely erased by the court and replaced with one that
attempted to assess her culpability not just based upon her behavior but
also based on her status as a black woman on welfare.' To support this
claim, the principal method of analysis within the article involved
interrogating stereotypical descriptions of my grandmother deployed
within the court's papers. The effects of the stereotypes were rendered
visible by comparing claims from the court's documents to media
accounts and personal family stories about her involvement within the
case.' At bottom, the article attempted to explore the inner workings of
what UCLA Law Professor Devon Carbado had brilliantly previously
described as the "crime of identity."6
As narrative discourse was at the heart of the article, this work
became part of a pre-existing debate over the use of the method within
legal scholarship, especially Critical Race Theory (CRT).' Notable
1. Alan Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STuD. 1, 2 (1986) (discussing Critical Legal Studies).
2. Mario L. Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating
the Power of Narrative, 39 UC DAVIS L. REv. 941 (2006). The article was based upon
research conducted while I was a William H. Hastie Fellow at the University of
Wisconsin Law School; while they were written at the same time, a co-author and I
first published another article: Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any
Other Name?: On Being "Regarded As" Black: Why Title VII Should Apply Even if
Lakeisha and Jamal are White, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 1283.
3. Barnes, supra note 2, at 963-66. The murder case at issue was People v.
Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1170 (1969).
4. Barnes, supra note 2, at 966-68.
5. Id. at 973-77.
6. See id. at 958 (citing Devon Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment,
100 MICH. L. REv. 946, 962 (2002)).
7. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Reshaping the Narrative Debate, 34 SEATTLE U.
L. REv. 751, 755-58 (2011); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073
(1989) (including contributions from renowned CRT scholars Derrick Bell, Richard
Delgado, and Patricia Williams). Interestingly, given how negatively some legal
scholars treated CRT uses of storytelling, narrative has now been embraced by other
disciplines, including the sciences. See DAvID HERMAN, STORYTELLING AND THE
SCIENCES OF THE MIND (2013) (using case studies and exploring connections between
narrative studies and cognitive sciences research).
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critics, such as Judge Richard Posner,' and legal scholars, including
Dan Farber and Suzanna Sherry,' Anne Coughlin,"o Douglas Litowitz,"
and Dan Subotnik,12 derided CRT based on its use of allegory,
autobiography, and other personal stories. The conventional criticism
held that CRT's reliance on narrative or "storytelling" was problematic
because stories were neither verifiable nor necessarily typical and stood
in opposition to more appropriate methods of legal inquiry that sought
to elevate so-called objective and neutral truths.13 As a result of this
skepticism, at the time, scholar Kim Scheppele noted a disjuncture
within legal discourse involving the use of stories, where insiders were
presumed to tell stories that were "officially approved" while outsiders
were presumed to tell stories that were "officially distrusted."14
As "Black Women's Stories" was being written, an important text
on legal consciousness was gaining significant attention in sociolegal
circles. In that text, based on a number of in-depth interviews with
subjects about their everyday interactions, scholars Patricia Ewick and
Susan Silbey presented a constitutive theory of legal consciousness.
Their theory described law as both influenced by, and central to, the
construction of citizen attitudes and understandings." For many who
read the book, a key innovation of the Ewick and Silbey framework
was that it suggested all people had access to a multiplicative or
8. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737
(1997); Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40.
9. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV.
807 (1993).
10. Anne Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in
Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1995).
11. Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (1997).
12. DAN SUBOTNIK, ToxiC DIVERSITY: RACE, GENDER, AND LAW TALK IN
AMERICA (2005).
13. Barnes, supra note 2, at 952; Nancy Cook, The Call to Witness:
Historical Divides, Literary Narrative, and the Power of Oath, 98 MARQ. L. REV.
1585, 1588-92 (2015); Levit, supra note 7, at 755; cf. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &
JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 110 (2000) ("This endless telling and retelling,
casting and recasting of stories is essential to the conduct of the law. It is how law's
actors comprehend whatever series of events they make the subject of their legal
actions.").
14. Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073,
2079-80 (1989).
15. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity,
Contestation, and Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 731 (1992).
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polyvocal consciousness." This meant that at varying times subjects
found themselves "before the law" or submitting to seemingly reified
legal process; "with the law," reflecting agency or an ability to game
legal processes; or even "against the law," which involved the
deployment of strategies to resist law's demands." As a critical scholar,
the real revelation in this work was in the fact that their method
essentially consisted of theorizing about legal attitudes and norms based
upon the harvesting of a few stories culled from a larger set of
interviews. In effect, a method that had been so vilified within CRT
was commonly accepted as a part of qualitative inquiry within the
sociolegal studies.'" Through stories, I surmised that both critical and
sociolegal scholars generated "separate but compatible theories to
explain how we exist in the world."" While I later complicated my
beliefs about the use of narrative in sociolegal and critical scholarship,20
I suggested then and still believe in stories as a point of synergy around
which collaborations can be forged and sociolegal knowledge can be
gained.21
In the years after I articulated an interest in stories as a point of
commonality between critical and sociolegal scholars, a formal and
deliberate project centering on placing broader swaths of race scholars
and social scientists in greater conversation was undertaken. The work
16. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 15, at 44-47.
17. Id. at 47-49.
18. My point was not just that Ewick and Silbey and other sociolegal
researchers included interviews within their studies, it was that their claims that stories
as tools or method held special significance in understanding how legal attitudes and
outcomes were constructed. Barnes, supra note 2, at 979-87; see also LAw's STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND THE RHETORIC IN LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996);
Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10
ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 149, 161 (2014) ("[S]ocial science itself has recognized
storytelling as a valuable way of describing the racial and political landscape from
within it."); Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic
Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 197 (1995). For a
discussion on narrative as a research tool common to law and other literatures, see
Mitsunori Misawa, Social Justice Narrative Inquiry: A Queer Crit Perspective 240-42
(Adult Educ. Research Conference, Paper No. 34, 2012), available at
http://newprairiepress.org/aerc/2012/papers/34/; Daniel G. Sol6rza & Tara J. Yosso,
Critical Race Methodology: Counter-Storytelling as an Analytical Framework for
Education Research, 8 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 23 (2002) (discussing how CRT's use of
the concept of "counter-stories" could be used as a means to displace so-called
objective and neutral narrative accounts within education scholarship).
19. Barnes, supra note 2, at 985.
20. Mario L. Barnes, Racial Paradox in a Law and Society Odyssey, 44 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 469, 473, 475-81 (2010) (arguing that based on the experiences of
critical scholars applying narrative methodology, a greater sensitivity may need to be
demonstrated when law and society scholars engage in similar forms of storytelling).
21. Id. at 480-83.
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and movement that grew out of that project is now referred to as
empirical methods and critical race theory (e-CRT).22 One of the
progenitors of the project was UC Hastings Law Professor Osagie
Obasogie, who, along with his colleague Professor Joan Williams,
convened working groups in 2010 and 2011 to consider "rethinking
race scholarship in a manner that reflected the theoretical orientation
put forward by critical race scholarship and also embraced the
methodological contributions of social science research. "23 These
groups have continued to meet regularly at academic institutions across
the country and have produced two volumes of e-CRT writings,2 in
addition to the work presented within this publication.
As is typically the case with a burgeoning movement, a moment
arises where it is appropriate to reflect on its progress. The goal here is
to further elaborate upon the history of e-CRT's multi-disciplinary
collaboration but also to interrogate where the project now finds itself,
six years in. Given that the movement and work are still early in their
development, a full assessment of the e-CRT movement and the
scholarship it has produced is a bit premature. Within this space,
however, it is possible to assess what has transpired thus far and pose a
series of questions about the current status and future possibilities of
e-CRT. Consistent with the quote that begins this article, which
describes an early assessment of Critical Legal Studies (CLS), it is at
least time to inquire into whether participation in e-CRT requires one to
adopt a set of commitments or conform for the purpose of theoretical or
methodological coherence. As others before have warned, it can be
problematic to attempt to superimpose an orthodoxy over an
in-progress, context-specific, and shifting scholarly movement.2 Even
understanding the challenge of a review at this point, it is possible to
query what it means for a scholar or scholarship to be considered a part
of e-CRT. Are there a range of options for what it means to "do" this
22. In the alternative, the movement is also referred to as "Critical Race
Theory and Empirical Methods." See, e.g., Symposium, Critical Race Theory and
Empirical Methods Conference, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2953 (2015).
23. Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical
Methods, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 183, 185 (2013).
24. See Symposium, Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods, 3 UC
IRVINE L. REV. 183 (2013); Symposium, supra note 22.
25. On this point, with regard to CRT, founding member Professor Kimberl6
Crenshaw has surmised,
Specifically, the view of CRT as a stable project sometimes denies the
extent to which CRT was and continues to be constituted through a series of
dynamic engagements ituated within specific institutions over the terms by
which their racial logics would be engaged.
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to
Move Forward, 43 CoNN. L. REV. 1253, 1260 (2011).
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work? As a project at the intersection of disparate disciplinary
traditions, are there certain views or practices endemic to CRT or the
social sciences that must be represented before one can claim that work
is situated within the e-CRT enterprise? As a movement the substantive
origins of which are tied to CRT, e-CRT is presumed to maintain a
strong commitment to anti-subordination. Based on initial working
group meetings and writings, however, I have uncovered few assertions
of other hardened e-CRT principles, parameters, or requirements. As
such, initial questions about e-CRT are much more likely to focus on
who can and should police its intentionally porous boundaries.
In service to these and other questions, Part I below will trace the
origins of the e-CRT movement. Part II will assess the progress of the
movement by evaluating some of the early work produced within it,
with a focus on the constitution of collaborations and questioning what
it actually means to "do" e-CRT. In light of the progress of the
movement thus far and the troubles that have plagued previous
progressive scholarly movements, Part III evaluates challenges e-CRT
frameworks may face moving forward. This evaluation of e-CRT
concludes by suggesting that all processes involving collaboration
require compromise. The ultimate success of e-CRT will turn on
whether the concessions that will be required to keep complex concepts
of race grounded in empirical research and social science methods
utilized as a meaningful tool within progressive racial discourses prove
manageable or fatal.
I. ORIGIN STORIES
Scholarly movements often have origin stories, which involve
connections to earlier movements and groups of scholars, along with
key moments of fissure or breakaway. CLS,26 for example, partially
owed its genesis to groundwork laid by law and society scholars27 and
intellectual terrain first plowed by the legal realists.28 The CRT
26. For an overview of Critical Legal Studies, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1982).
27. See OSAGIE OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE
EYES OF THE BLIND 183 (2014).
28. Id. at 184; Hunt, supra note 1, at 4 ("The sense of excitement and
expectation generated by the emergence of critical legal studies is in large part due to
the promise it holds out of replacing this dominant tradition of liberal legalism. It
explains in no small degree the self-consciousness of the critical theorists of their
linkages to the Realist tradition."). For a description of the tenets of Legal Realism, see
Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICs 278
(2001).
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movement, by contrast, has a complex origin story2 9 but was partially
spurred by key disagreements related to both intellectual commitments
and annual gatherings within CLS. 0 While they are not precisely
successor movements, a number of even more recent scholarly
movements, including Latina/o Critical Theory (LatCrit),"
Socioeconomic Class Critical Theory (ClassCrits),32 and Queer Critical
Theory (Queer Crits),33 certainly owe a part of their formation to CRT.
An interesting aspect of the rise of the e-CRT movement is that it defies
this breakaway tradition. The e-CRT project was not created in a
moment of theoretical dispute with another generative movement.
Rather, e-CRT arose out of an intentional attempt to forge a union
between scholars, traditions, and methods previously thought to be
more disparate than complementary. That genesis is next considered.
29. Kimberl6 Crenshaw notes that CRT was produced from a "unique
confluence of temporal, institutional, and political factors." Crenshaw, supra note 25,
at 1258. "[Wlhat nourished CRT and facilitated its growth from a collection of
institutional and discursive interventions into a sustained intellectual project was a
certain dialectical misalignment." Id. at 1259; see also Richard Delgado, Liberal
McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1505, 1510-14
(2009) (noting that CRT owes part of its sustained success to student activism at
Harvard and Berkeley and the events of a CLS meeting in Los Angeles, all of which
took place in the late 1980s).
30. See OBASOGIE, supra note 27, at 183-84; Mario L. Barnes, "The More
Things Change . . . ": New Moves for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a
"Post-Race " World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043 (2016); Devon W. Carbado, Critical
What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593, 1596-99, 1603 (2011); Kimberl6 Crenshaw et
al., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, at xiii (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Crenshaw, supra note 25, at
1287-88, 1295-96.
31. Frank Valdes, one of the founders of LatCrit, provides the following
description of its origins:
Born from and during a 1995 colloquium on Latinas/os and critical race
theory, LatCrit theory is an intervention designed to highlight Latinalo
concerns and voices in legal discourse and social policy. As its origins
indicate, this Latinalo-identified genre of outsider jurisprudence was
conceived as a movement closely related to CRT. Because it was born of
the CRT experience, LatCrit theory views itself as a "close cousin" to
CRT, a cousin that always welcomes CRT, both in spirit and in the flesh, to
its gatherings.
Francisco Valdes, LatCrit: A Conceptual Overview, LATCRIT,
http://latcrit.org/content/about/conceptual-overview/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
32. ClassCrits have adopted a name that appears to refer to no long-form
variant and is described as "reflect[ing] our interest in focusing on economics through
the lens of critical legal scholarship movements, such as critical legal studies, critical
feminist theory, critical race theory, LatCrit, and queer theory." About ClassCrits,
CLASSCRITS, https://classcrits.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
33. For an introduction to Queer Critical Theory, see NIKKI SULLIVAN, A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO QUEER THEORY (2003).
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At least as early as University of Hawaii Law Professor Charles
Lawrence's borrowing of social psychology literature on unconscious
bias in his germinal 1987 Stanford Law Review article, "The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,"3 we
have seen critical race scholars attempt to deploy social science frames,
methods, and research in their work. Two scholars, in particular,
however, were at he forefront of conceptualizing and laying ground
work for a collaborative project between race scholars and empirical
researchers: UCLA Law Professor Laura G6mez and UC Hastings
College of the Law Professor Osagie Obasogie. It is in their work that
we see a broad-based call for a more nuanced study of race in law and
the social sciences that has become known as e-CRT. It is also their
work that has provided at least an initial pronouncement for the nature
of partnerships or substance of work to be considered under the e-CRT
umbrella.
In 2004, Professor G6mez published "A Tale of Two Genres: On
the Real and Ideal Links Between Law and Society and Critical Race
Theory," which appears as a chapter in the Blackwell Companion to
Law and Society." In that chapter, Professor G6mez opined that law
and society scholars had not been sufficiently attentive to issues of
racial inequality. Though she presented data demonstrating that there
was a dearth of race scholarship published in the premier peer-reviewed
sociolegal journals,3 6 she also pointed out that "[race does not exist
outside of law; it is constituted by law."3 G6mez explains that the
empirical operationalization of race should capture the complexity of
race as a social reality that changes in different historical and social
contexts. Importantly, she cautioned sociolegal researchers that it would
be a mistake to "treat[] race as an easily measurable independent
variable."38 She also criticized CRT scholars for failing to fully
34. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
35. Laura E. G6mez, A Tale of Two Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links
Between Law and Society and Critical Race Theory, in BLACKWELL COMPANION TO
LAW AND SOCIETY 453 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
36. Id. at 456-57 (noting that, between two leading law and society journals,
only fifteen articles on race were published over the ten-year period of 1990-2000).
37. Id. at 453.
38. Id. at 455; Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18, at 157 (discussing
research variables and claiming "ostensibly neutral practices regarding the choice of
dependent and independent variables necessarily preclude more nuanced and more
structural investigations of race"). An equally concerning condition exists when
scholars oversimplify the meaning of race. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking
Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation, 62 AM. Soc. REv. 465, 465 (1996)
("[M]any analysts of racial matters have abandoned the serious theorization and
reconceptualization of their central topic: racism.").
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operationalize their theories of race "due in part to a failure to engage
methodologies common in law and society research.""
In 2012, she revisited these themes in her Law and Society
presidential address, "Looking for Race in All the Wrong Places,"
which appeared in the Law and Society Review.40 There, she argued
that sociolegal scholars should not only conceptualize race as socially
constructed but should also "grapple with the gap between how race is
theorized and how we operationalize race in empirical research."4 In
her address, she offered three broad suggestions for reshaping a
sociolegal research agenda: (1) race should be studied as a process
rather than as an outcome; (2) researchers should design more
comparative studies that look at race, racism, and racialization across
racial groups; and (3) researchers should pay careful attention to the
conceptualization of race being used in research.42
Professor G6mez's goals for how race should occupy a more
prominent place in sociolegal studies were built upon by Professor
Obasogie. First, in 2006, he followed up her work analyzing the
articles published in leading peer-reviewed sociolegal journals.
Confirming her results, he found that a careful study of race was rarely
at the center of published work and that sociolegal journals published
race-centered work less often than most top law journals.4 3 Second, in
addition to forming the e-CRT working groups," Professor Obasogie
explicated the proposed goals of a cooperative e-CRT project. In a
foreword to the first e-CRT symposium, published in the UC Irvine
Law Review, he stated,
Linking social science methods with critical race theory
provides a remarkable opportunity to pursue race scholarship
39. G6mez, supra note 35, at 453.
40. Laura E. G6mez, Looking for Race in All the Wrong Places, 46 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 221 (2012).
41. Id. at 234.
42. Id. at 235-36.
43. Osagie K. Obasogie, Race in Law and Society: A Critique, in RACE, LAW
AND SOCIETY 445 (Ian Haney L6pez ed., 2006). Professor Obasogie has recently
expanded on the analysis in this chapter. See Osagie K. Obasogie, The Constitution of
Identity: Law and Race, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND SOCIETY 339 (Austin Sarat &
Patricia Ewick eds., 2015). At a time when Professor G6mez and Professor Obasogie
were discussing the lack of race-focused work in peer-reviewed journals, it is worth
noting that Cincinnati Law Professor Emily Houh offered a similar critique of edited
sociolegal manuscripts. See Emily M.S. Houh, Still, at the Margins, 40 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 481 (2006) (reviewing THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAW: INTRODUCTORY
READINGS (Austin Sarat ed., 2004) and criticizing the lack on CRT scholars within the
collection and the failure of law and society scholars to more generally embrace CRT
perspectives).
44. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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that is both theoretically sophisticated and empirically robust.
That is to say, it is an opportunity to think about and measure
race in new and exciting ways that builds upon the strengths
of multiple disciplines to assess, document, and theoretically
extrapolate the hidden ways in which not only law and society
construct race, but the way that race constructs law and
society.45
While the work of Professors G6mez and Obasogie was formative
to what has come to be called e-CRT, other critical and sociolegal
scholars have also referenced the potential of CRT and social science
hybrid formations. For example, while I questioned his use of narrative
in the piece,' in his 2009 presidential address, Law and Society
President Richard Lempert also called for sociolegal scholars to take up
the cause of racial equality in their research.47 In other contexts,
scholars contributed to expanding ties between critical and empirical
work by establishing interdisciplinary institutional bodies, which
foregrounded studies of race. The University of California Center for
New Racial Studies-a multi-campus research program-was one such
body. In addition to funding race-themed research by University of
California graduate students and scholars from amongst all of the
campuses," it has also published emblematic work.4 9 The potential
synergy between CRT and other disciplines has also been embraced by
senior CRT scholars. In 2011, in a piece reassessing the history,
contributions, and future possibilities of CRT, movement co-founder
Professor Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw wrote that the next phase for
CRT will require it to embrace scholars from other disciplines. She
noted, in particular,
Building on our own histories of synthesizing thematic
frames within the interstices of competing ideological
discourses, the potential for recreating the conditions of
possibility today lie in identifying counterparts who, like
critical race theorists, currently reside at the margins of a
45. Obasogie, supra note 23, at 185.
46. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
47. Richard Lempert, A Personal Odyssey Toward a Theme: Race and
Equality in the United States: 1948-2009, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 431 (2010).
48. The Center was only funded for a term of years and is no longer
supplying grants. For information on its work, including the research proposals it
funded, see U. CAL. CENTER FOR NEW RACIAL STUD., http://www.u-enrs.ucsb.edu/
(last visited Apr. 28, 2016).
49. See, e.g., THE NATION AND ITS PEOPLES: CITIZENS, DENIZENS, MIGRANTS
(John S.W. Park & Shannon Gleeson eds., 2014).
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variety of different disciplines, who are in some ways lined up
within and in other ways critical of the prevailing
knowledge-producing conventions about race within their field
of practice. What is needed is a crisp exchange of ideas,
tools, histories and contemporary understandings from critical
thinkers who are fully conversant with and able to deploy the
conventions of their disciplines to explain how they contribute
to racial hierarchy."
Other critical scholars have expressed similar views that, moving
forward, CRT scholars will need to engage with myriad disciplines and
methods."
While the call to collaborate has been clear, the specifics of those
collaborations are somewhat ambiguous. Legal scholars such as
Professors G6mez, Obasogie, and Carbado advocate that e-CRT should
involve a mutually respectful structure I refer to as a "framing of
equals," under which the engagements between CRT and social science
research would be understood as mutually beneficial." Additionally,
Professor Crenshaw indicated that CRT scholars reaching out to other
disciplines should do so keeping CRT's political commitments intact.53
These formation calls did not, however, attempt to specify preferred
types of collaborations between critical egal scholars and social
scientists or articulate the components of the work to be considered
within the e-CRT oeuvre.54 It is for this reason that e-CRT-like CRT
50. Crenshaw, supra note 25, at 1348-49.
51. Devon Carbado, for example, stated, "[T]he time is ripe for what one
might call 'Critical Race Empiricism'-that is, a methodological approach that would
constitute an empirical intervention into CRT and a CRT intervention into empirical
studies." Carbado, supra note 30, at 1638; see also CRITICAL RACE REALISM:
INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND LAW (Gregory S. Parks et al. eds., 2010)
(calling for law to more liberally borrow empirical findings from psychological
studies); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and
the Law, 58 UCLA L. REv. 465 (2010) (discussing "behavioral realism," which applies
psychological and cognitive research within law).
52. See supra notes 6, 35-43, 51 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
54. By contrast, LatCrit, as part of its self-definition, prescribed necessary
commitments to knowledge production and anti-subordination politics. On this point,
founding scholars Francisco Valdes and Margaret Montoya have claimed,
In our view, the principal purpose of Latina/o legal studies must be to
elucidate and disseminate suppressed knowledges that can help to facilitate
this sort of social justice action. From our perspective, the point of situating
Latinas/os at the epicenter of contemporary legal discourses must be to
nudge along this intergenerational, international, and interdisciplinary
struggle against historic supremacies and present hierarchies. As a matter of
substance and principle, the LatCrit example, we hope, will help to nudge
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itself-should be imagined as a fairly broad umbrella movement. To
explore what e-CRT is, then, is not to instantiate an orthodoxy but to
assess the work that has been done. One challenge that exists in
discerning whether work is e-CRT is that, outside of articles within
symposia grouped under the topic, it is not clear which articles touching
upon race and social science should be included. Based on that
challenge, a primary question to be explored must be what it means for
scholars and work to respectively "do" and "be" e-CRT.
II. CONSIDERING WHAT IT MEANS To "Do" E-CRT
Given that the e-CRT project centers neither on a narrowly
focused subject matter nor on a particular method but instead on a call
for a type of mutually respectful engagement that produces a more
searching consideration of race, it can be difficult to absolutely declare
what work is definitively e-CRT." For example, one might
presumptively consider work that has appeared in e-CRT symposia to
be, through self-identification, representative whether or not the pieces
are widely interdisciplinary in nature or consider race in particular
ways.56 What other work should be included? Certain disciplines
outside of law, for example, have wholly or partially embraced CRT as
a means of internal critique, and recently, scholars have considered
more deliberate ways to introduce CRT across borders." There is no
Latina/o studies and actions in law and policy away from just another
iteration of assimilationist self-interest politics-as-usual, and toward
something new, something better, something more reasonably calculated to
promote social justice through knowledge production and principled action.
Margaret E. Montoya & Francisco Valdes, "Latinas/os" and the Politics of Knowledge
Production: LatCrit Scholarship and Academic Activism as Social Justice Action, 83
IND. L.J. 1197, 1201 (2008).
55. Scholars found a similar predicament to exist for CRT. See G6mez, supra
note 35, at 454 ("[N]either what constitutes critical race theory nor which authors write
from the perspective are self-evident; both questions are contested by people within the
field and outside it." (citation omitted)).
56. See infra notes 66, 67, 73, 75, 97 and accompanying text.
57. See Crenshaw, supra note 25, at 1256 (noting CRT has had an influence
on "education, psychology, cultural studies, political science, and even philosophy"
(citation omitted)). For over a decade, education has been an example of a discipline
that has significantly embraced CRT. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION: ALL
GOD'S CHILDREN GOT A SONG (Adrienne D. Dixon & Celia K. Rousseau eds., 2006);
Gloria Ladson Billings, Race . . . to the Top, Again: Comments on the Genealogy of
Critical Race Theory, 43 CONN. L. REv. 1439, 1452 (2011).
58. See, e.g., MATHIAS MOSCHEL, LAW, LAWYERS AND RACE: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY FROM THE UNITED STATES To EUROPE (2014). In Australia, scholars have
developed the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association
(ACRAWSA), which has borrowed the insight of U.S. CRT founders to advance a
"body of scholarship which engages an interdisciplinary approach to critique and
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reason such endeavors should not be included, but there has been little
scholarly discussion of the breadth of the movement. By contrast, other
work that both includes empirical studies and considers race in varied
and sophisticated ways may claim no affiliation to the e-CRT
movement. Is this work also e-CRT? I am not sure there is anyone who
could answer this question. As e-CRT involves a loosely associated
group of scholars with some similar intellectual commitments but no
power to police group inclusion, the answer almost certainly must be,
"maybe." Though a researcher's intent may not dictate how work is
understood or embraced, no work should be co-opted by a scholarly
project if that project includes even a thin ideological component.
Therefore, if a researcher is not at least willing to minimally accept a
movement's important tenets, then inclusion should be suspect.59
A. e-CRT and Collaborative Form as Method
Just because there may be some difficulty in discerning which
work belongs to the burgeoning e-CRT tradition does not mean that we
are incapable of performing some interim assessment. Within and
outside of e-CRT symposia, there has been scholarship over the last
several years that draws on social science methods and critical race
literatures. This work, by different configurations of scholars from law
and other disciplines, has taken on widely disparate topics. Based upon
that work, I wish to propose that at least four options or categories for
"doing" e-CRT have emerged.'
deconstruct the function of hegemonic whiteness in Anglo-Australian law." Trish Luker
& Jennifer Nielsen, Editorial: Law Race and Whiteness, 4 ACRAWSA E-J., no. 2,
2008, at 4, http://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/editorials/
10IntroductionLuker&Nielsen.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
59. The point here is that there are ways in which scholars could do
interdisciplinary race work that would offend those advocating e-CRT. This was
certainly the case with CRT, where some work on race, which included legal
considerations, had nothing to do with the progressive and anti-racist approaches of
CRT. See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUzA, THE END OF RACISM (1995); DAN FARBER &
SUSANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN
AMERICAN LAW (1997); JOHN MCWHORTER, JR., LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN
BLACK AMERICA (2001); STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN
BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1999). For a criticism of some of the
positions advanced by these and other conservative scholars, see MICHAEL BROWN ET
AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 5-8, 132-42
(2003).
60. In a previous writing, I suggested that there were primarily two ways to
"do" e-CRT-critical scholars leveraging empirical work and working alone or with
empiricists to create research studies. See Mario L. Barnes, Taking a Stand?: An Initial
Assessment of the Social and Racial Effects of Recent Innovations in Self-Defense Laws,
83 FORDHAM L. REv. 3179, 3185 (2015).
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1. SOLO CROSS-DISCIPLINARIANS
Some e-CRT work is accomplished by scholars with training in
empirical methods and a demonstrated awareness of CRT's tenets,
methods, and political commitments" as solo cross-disciplinarians.
These scholars are so named because, based on their training and
knowledge, they conduct their own original empirical work without
collaborators. The hallmark of the best work of these scholars is that
61. While attempting to identify a fully representative set of premises would
be difficult, some generally accepted CRT tenets have been identified. See OBASOGIE,
supra note 27, at 190-99 (identifying the defining characteristics of CRT as a focus on
race as socially constructed, defining the contours of intersectionality and
anti-essentialism, and storytelling). Carbado and Roithmayr contributed the following
list:
1. Racial inequality is hardwired into the fabric of our social and economic
landscape.
2. Because racism exists at both the subconscious and conscious levels, the
elimination of intentional racism would not eliminate racial inequality.
3. Racism intersects with other forms of inequality, such as classism,
sexism, and homophobia.
4. Our racial past exerts contemporary effects.
5. Racial change occurs when the interests of white elites converge with the
interests of the racially disempowered.
6. Race is a social construction whose meanings and effects are contingent
and change over time.
7. The concept of color blindness in law and social policy and the argument
for ostensibly race-neutral practices often serve to undermine the interests
of people of color.
8. Immigration laws that restrict Asian and Mexican entry into the United
States regulate the racial makeup of the nation and perpetuate the view that
people of Asian and Latino descent are foreigners.
9. Racial stereotypes are ubiquitous in society and limit the opportunities of
people of color.
10. The success of various policy initiatives often depends on whether the
perceived beneficiaries are people of color.
Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18, at 151. This list has tenets in common with
earlier articulations of CRT. See also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and
Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1766-67 (2003) (discussing
systemic racism, the dangers of colorblind racism, and understanding the potentially
intersectional characteristics of oppression as core CRT tenets advanced in
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al.
eds., 2002)). As a general matter, CRT has been described by one of its co-founders as
a movement committed to "transforming the relationship among race, racism, and
power." RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 2 (2001). A number of prominent CRT theories and commitments are
discussed in the foreword to the second e-CRT symposium. See Kimani Paul-Emile,
Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods Conference, 83 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2953, 2955-57 (2015).
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race is investigated in nuanced and innovative ways. Two notable
scholars associated with e-CRT who have produced work of this ilk in
recent years are Osagie Obasogie and Kaaryn Gustafson. Professor
Obasogie conducted an empirical study that queried how the blind
understand the concept of race. He found that race was so central as a
social-organizing influence within the United States that related
negative stereotypes are effectively communicated even to persons who
were blind since birth. Through interviews conducted with aid
recipients outside of welfare offices, Gustafson's study explored how
welfare policies, including rules criminalizing welfare fraud,
disproportionately and negatively affect women of color.63 Both of these
scholars conducted empirical research that was attendant not only to
how race shapes the phenomena they were studying but to the specific
tenets of CRT.' Such a focus is a primary goal of e-CRT work.65
Solo cross-disciplinarians need not be JD/PhDs, just persons with
both methodological training and familiarity with critical race
discourses. For example, Temple University criminal justice scholar
Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve has no law degree but has been involved in
the e-CRT working groups, and I would consider her a solo
cross-disciplinarian. Her new book, from the Stanford University
Press, Crook County: Racism and Injustice in America's Largest
Criminal Court, which employs ethnography to explore racial abuses
62. OBASOGIE, supra note 27.
63. See KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011). Another good example of this type of
ethnographic e-CRT work is Boston University Law Professor Khiara Bridges's
excellent work on the politicized and racialized aspects of pregnancy and birth. See
KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A SITE
OF RACIALIZATION (2011).
64. GUSTAFSON, supra note 63, at 189-202; OBASOGIE, supra note 27, at
183-204. It should be noted that both books won the Herbert Jacob Book Prize from
the Law and Society Association. For a list of Herbert Jacob Book Prize winners, see
Herbert Jacob Book Prize Winners, LAW & SOC'Y Ass'N,
http://www.lawandsociety.org/prizes/jacob-winners.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
While any list of this kind should be regarded as necessarily partial, another strong
example of work by a researcher trained in law and empirical methods predated the
formation of e-CRT. See LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW,
HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE PUBLIC SPEECH (2004) (While this work did not address
CRT specifically, it included thoughtful and nuanced considerations of how race shaped
the legal attitudes and legal consciousness of the study subjects with regard to First
Amendment protections and enforcements.). Laura Beth Nielsen, however, has been a
participant in e-CRT working groups and her more recent work fits well within the
formal e-CRT project. See, e.g., Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining
Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 So. CAL. L.
REV. 313 (2012) (using an empirical study of federal employment discrimination cases
to determine how identity affects judicial decision making).
65. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
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within Cook County criminal courts, certainly qualifies as
representative e-CRT work.' Solo cross-disciplinarians do, however,
tend to be sociolegal or law-and-society scholars who give
considerations of race greater primacy in their work.67 It is no surprise,
then, that other examples of such scholarship have been produced by
scholars with significant ties to the Law and Society Association.8
While the solo cross-disciplinarian category works well for
scholars trained and working at he intersection of law and social
sciences, it is less clear to what extent it also covers race work not
necessarily inclusive of CRT theories or race scholars trained and
working more squarely within the humanities. More generally, there
has been little discussion of whether e-CRT would embrace race work
employing methods that are less empirically focused, such as literary
66. NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE
IN AMERICA'S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016). In the acknowledgments section of the
book she references the importance of e-CRT to the project. Id. at 192. One could
make a similar claim about the recent work of Ellen Berrey, another sociologist without
a law degree, whose work interrogates the legal and social implications of racial
diversity. See ELLEN BERREY, THE ENIGMA OF DIVERSITY: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE
AND THE LIMITS OF RACIAL JUSTICE (2015). There are other examples of non-JD/PhD
solo cross-disciplinarian, whose primary discipline is law: Indiana Law Professor
Victor Quintanilla is trained in law and policy but has designed and used empirical
studies within his research. See, e.g., Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A
Social Psychological Study of Iqbal's Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011); Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism: A New
Means to Measure Civil Procedure, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 187, 188 (2013); see also
Thomas W. Mitchell, Destabilizing the Normalization of Rural Black Land Loss: A
Critical Role for Legal Empiricism, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 557 (example of a law professor
conducting his own on-the-ground empirical research of black land loss through forced
sales in the American South).
67. There are other such examples from the recent two e-CRT collections. See
Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Modem Day Scarlet Letter, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2999, 3002-03
(2015); Meera E. Deo, Faculty Insights on Educational Diversity, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3115, 3117-18 (2015); Paul Gowder, Critical Race Science and Critical Race
Philosophy of Science, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3155, 3157-58 (2015); Kaaryn Gustafson,
Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3 UC IRVINE
L. REV. 297, 300 (2013).
68. Obasogie, Gustafson, and Nielsen are long-time members and have served
as trustees and officers within the Law and Society Association (LSA). Nicole Gonzalez
Van Cleve is the co-chair of the LSA "Critical Research on Race and the Law"
Collaborative Research Network, which organizes panels at each annual meeting. See
2016 - 2018 Trustees, LAW & Soc'Y Ass'N, http://www.lawandsociety.org/officers/
2018trustees.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). Other similar sociolegal scholars who
have produced solo cross-disciplinary e-CRT work include UCLA Law Professor and
former LSA President Laura G6mez and Indiana University Law Professor and former
LSA Treasurer Jeannine Bell. See, e.g., LAURA E. G6MEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE
MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE (2008); JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY
NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN
AMERICAN HOUSING 4 (2013).
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critique or discourse analysis. The potential limits of e-CRT as an
organizing structure will be discussed further below. For now,
however, consider what it might mean to suggest that he life-changing
work of towering figures such as W.E.B. Du Bois,69 Toi Morrison,70
Cornel West,71 and James Baldwin72 would not have been considered
sufficiently empirical to be included within the developing e-CRT
tradition.
2. FRUITFUL COLLABORATIONS
Fruitful collaboration may be the quintessential form of work that
was expected when e-CRT was moved from theory into practice. After
all, the working groups began by bringing critical scholars into contact
with empiricists with the hope that insights and approaches would be
shared and that joint projects could one day result. In early meetings, it
was common to ask critical scholars to introduce and comment upon
empirical work and social scientists to present and provide feedback on
critical work. Fruitful collaborations, then, honor the fact that legal
scholars may not always have the in-depth knowledge of methods that
will be needed for significant projects. Similarly, empirical scholars
may fail to design studies or interpret data in ways that are sensitive
enough to capture phenomena that critical theories have explicated.
Coming together in fruitful collaboration, legal scholars and social
69. While Du Bois was the first African American to earn a PhD in sociology
at Harvard, in 1895, some of his most important work was produced as essays and
literary/cultural critique. See, e.g., W.E. BURGHARDT Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK
FOLK (1909); W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (Transaction
Publishers 2013) (1935) (While it uses some post-war empirical data, the text is largely
written as an essay.). Diversity between academic training and the form and content of
published work exists in the modern scholarly circles as well. See, e.g., JULIANNE
MALVEAUX, ARE WE BETTER OFF? RACE, OBAMA AND PUBLIC POLICY (2016). Dr.
Malveaux is an economist trained at MIT and former college president. Id. at ix. She,
however, is also a public intellectual who more routinely publishes her social and
political commentaries as columns and essays. See, e.g., JULIANNE MALVEAUX, WALL
STREET, MAIN STREET AND THE SIDE STREET: A MAD ECONOMIST TAKES A STROLL
(1999) (a collection or her columns); Julianne Malveaux, Race, Rage, and the Ace of
Spades, in WHEN RACE BECOMES REAL: BLACK AND WHITE WRITERS CONFRONT THEIR
PERSONAL HISTORIES 101 (Bernestine Singley ed., 2002) (an essay exploring what it
means to play the race card).
70. TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY
IMAGINATION (1992).
71. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (rev. ed. 2001).
72. JAMES BALDWIN, NOTES OF A NATIVE SON (Beacon Press 2012) (1955);
JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (Vintage International 1993) (1962) (assessing
the perils connected to America refusing to accept its fate as a multiracial nation).
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scientists work together on projects that not only include multifaceted
considerations of race but also employ empirical methods.
One such recent example is Wisconsin Law Professor Tonya
Brito's ongoing and fascinating work with social scientists observing
and documenting the contours of child support enforcement proceedings
in multiple locations. An initial analysis of their data on how these
proceedings construct race is included in the Fordham Law Review
e-CRT collection." Another example is work that my colleague UC
Irvine Law Professor L. Song Richardson has conducted on policing
and the deployment of suspicion heuristics with UCLA social
psychologist Phil Goff.74
Fruitful collaborations, however, should not be thought to be
simplistic configurations consisting of one legal scholar and one
empiricist. From this and the past e-CRT collections, we see multiple
examples of co-authoring involving persons from multiple disciplines,
including law-trained scholars, who have at other times published as
solo cross-disciplinarians." The contribution of e-CRT seems to be that
it presupposes, or at least encourages, dynamic and shifting partnering
as part of representative projects. These partnerships not only
encourage mutual respect for different kinds of knowledge76 but also
result in e-CRT being partially constructed as an inter-disciplinary and
collective enterprise.
3. THEORY ENGAGERS
In the early working groups, a point of tension in the meetings was
the assertion that empirical research presented an opportunity for
critical scholars to test theories that had long been advanced. As
Professor Kimani Paul-Emile asserted, the hopeful understanding of
social scientists taking up CRT doctrines involved "the premise that he
significant issues raised by CRT could be strengthened by increased
73. Tonya L. Brito et al., "I Do for My Kids": Negotiating Race and Racial
Inequality in Family Court, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027, 3028-29 (2015) (the project
brings together scholars from the areas of law, sociology, and social work).
74. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion
Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 295-96 (2012).
75. See, e.g., Ming Hsu Chen & Taeku Lee, Reimagining Democratic
Inclusion: Asian Americans and the Voting Rights Act, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 359, 361
(2013); Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Black Lives Matter and
Respectability Politics in Local News Accounts of Officer-Involved Civilian Deaths: An
Early Empirical Assessment, 2016 Wis. L. REV. 541; Osagie K. Obasogie et al., Race
in the Life Sciences: An Empirical Assessment, 1950-2000, 83 FoRDHAM L. REV. 3089,
3092 (2015); Gregory S. Parks & Rashawn Ray, Poetry as Evidence, 3 UC IRVINE L.
REV. 217, 220-21 (2013).
76. See infra notes 141, 143 and accompanying text.
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reliance on social science research methods that quantitatively and
qualitatively measure the structural inequities exposed through CRT
analysis."" A number of scholars, however, bristled at the idea that
claims emanating from the lived experience of discrimination and
subordination needed to be empirically verified. Moreover, these
scholars certainly would not have shifted or abandoned their beliefs
based on researchers asserting the claims could not be verified through
empirical studies. It is for this reason that empirical studies of
foundational CRT concepts, even when conducted by well-meaning and
sympathetic researchers, have a potential to damage the delicate trust
being built between critical and sociolegal scholars. This concern over
disconfirming studies, however, ultimately neither derailed future
working group meetings nor stalled the emergence of empirical studies
seeking to explicate CRT principles.
Thus far, attempts by empiricists to engage CRT's central theories
or tenets have been modest. The one topic around which a number of
studies have been conducted is intersectionality." Within legal
scholarship, Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw is widely regarded as
introducing the significance of the concept." Intersectionality was not
just a theory designed to suggest the importance of seeing an
individual's identity as existing at the intersection of their race, gender,
class, etc. Rather, the theory was about seeing discrimination as
occurring through overlapping and reinforcing practices, where certain
experiences-including but not limited to the experiences of black
women and others inhabiting multiple identity categories-were largely
left out of feminist and anti-discrimination discourses.so
In a number of recent studies of differing kinds, separate strands
of intersectionality theory have been the subject of empirical inquiry.
An early example of this empirical verification work was conducted by
Rachel Kahn Best, Lauren Edelman, Linda Krieger, and Scott Eliason.
They constructed a study assessing the ffects of filing intersectional
77. Paul-Emile, supra note 61, at 2957.
78. On the prevalence of intersectionality writing in CRT, see G6mez, supra
note 35, at 462.
79. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140; Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,
43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1242-44 (1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins].
80. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Why Intersectionality Can't Wait, WASH. POST
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/09/24/
why-intersectionality-cant-wait/.
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claims within the employment context." Unsurprisingly to critical
scholars, using a multivariate regression analysis, the study found that
persons making intersectional claims were disadvantaged. In fact, they
were only half as likely to prevail as those that alleged a single basis of
discrimination in employment cases.82 Additional studies of
intersectionality have been done by a political scientist, Ange-Marie
Hancock, who did not give primacy to exploring "intersectionality as a
testable explanation."" Rather, Hancock has sought to investigate the
"most appropriate way to empirically operationalize" the theory.8 4 The
research did so by shifting the focus from Crenshaw's conception of
intersectionalityss to the more multidimensional variant of "paradigm
intersectionality."" In this collection, there is a new and broader
engagement with intersectional analysis. In "Institutionalizing
Essentialism: Mechanisms of Intersectional Subordination Within the
LGBT Movement,"8 7 Gwendolyn Leachman expands the engagement
with intersectional theories to include feminist and CRT Scholar Angela
Harris's foundational work on antiessentialism.8 In a piece that deftly
brings CRT and sociolegal theories to bear, she "draw[s] on the
institutional research in sociology to suggest a series of structural
dynamics that may further explain the persistence of essentialism in
LGBT civil rights agendas and the agendas of similar civil rights
movements. "89 Interestingly, she argues that intramovement
marginalization by race (and other identity categories) arises out of
"institutional and organizational mechanisms"' rather than individual
insensitivities. The promising element of these particular examples of
"theory engagers" is that, in testing or applying the CRT concept of
81. Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 991, 992 (2011).
82. Id. at 1009. The study also found that claimants who were both women
and racial minorities experienced less success when filing claims. Id.
83. Ange-Marie Hancock, Empirical Intersectionality: A Tale of Two
Approaches, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 259, 260 (2013).
84. Id.
85. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 79, at 1244 ("exploring the
various ways in which race and gender intersect in shaping structural, political, and
representational aspects of violence against women of color").
86. Ange-Marie Hancock, When Is Fear for One's Life Race-Gendered? An
Intersectional Analysis of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals's In RE A-R-C-G-
Decision, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2981 (2015).
87. Gwendolyn M. Leachman, Institutionalizing Essentialism: Mechanisms of
Intersectional Subordination Within the LGBT Movement, 2016 Wis. L. REV. 655.
88. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
89. Leachman, supra note 87, at 657.
90. Id. at 682.
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intersectionality and building upon it, the social scientists have kept the
elements of the theory intact. There also have been no outcomes
suggesting that critical scholars need to rethink the theory or its
operation.
As Leachman's article demonstrates, one need not create and
conduct a study to test some CRT tenet in order to perform effective
theory engagement. In an area other than intersectionality, work by
Geoff Ward, in this current collection of articles, is also instructive.
Trained as a sociologist, Ward has previously done excellent work on
race and juvenile justice91 and historical racial violence.' More
recently, however, his work has particularly started to draw on the
insights of CRT. In both his work on "slow violence"93 and
"Microclimates of Racial Meaning: Historical Racial Violence and
Environmental Impacts,"94 he addresses synergies between social
sciences and CRT. Additionally, in the latter piece, he engages with
CRT founder Richard Delgado's theory of "rotten social background"
in his discussion of severe environmental deprivations.9 In much the
same way as the empiricists who engaged intersectionality theory,
Ward's complementary incorporation of CRT work is likely to raise no
concern from either critical scholars or social scientists. A critical
moment of fissure may, however, arise in e-CRT when an engagement
with a CRT principle or theory seeks to challenge or disprove it.' In
other words, the strength of any enterprise is much more likely to be
revealed in moments of contest rather than cooperation.
4. EMPIRICAL DIVINERS
Finally, the fourth category identified here describes e-CRT
scholars and projects that use existing empirical studies and research to
enhance their theories and claims. While not necessarily trained in
social science methods, these empirical diviners or dilettantes-
depending on ones' point of reference about the advisability of such
91. GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE (2012).
92. Nick Petersen & Geoff Ward, The Transmission of Historical Racial
Violence: Lynching, Civil Rights-Era Terror, and Contemporary Interracial Homicide,
5 RACE & JUST. 114 (2015).
93. Geoff Ward, The Slow Violence of State Organized Race Crime, 19
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 299, 300 (2015) (describing the phrase "slow violence" as
existing for victimization that is "attritional, dispersed, and hidden").
94. Geoff Ward, Microclimates of Racial Meaning: Historical Racial Violence
and Environmental Impacts, 2016 Wis. L. REV. 575.
95. Id. at 622-24.
96. Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18, at 150.
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work-seek to make sense of empirical findings within their projects.
The engagement with social science research can range from narrow or
strategic' to quite broad.98 Much of the work I have done over my
entire academic career, alone and with co-authors, has been of this
nature.' This also covers quite a bit of work that appears in the two
previously mentioned e-CRT symposia and this collection. A concern
that arises for this group is whether they have the empirical training and
sophistication necessary to understand the findings and potential
limitations of a given study. For example, social scientists who are
generally supportive of critical scholars drawing on empirical research
have expressed the following concern with regard to psychological
studies:
In their understandable eagerness to appropriate empirical
evidence that bears the legitimizing authority of psychological
science, perspectives like Critical Race Realism may turn a
blind eye toward the racial positioning inherent in scientific
theory and method.1"
97. Certain work, for example, uses social scientific theory as a background
literature to foreground the author's explication. See, e.g., DARIA RorrHMAYR,
REPRODUCING RACISM: How EVERYDAY CHOICEs LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014)
(using analogies to monopolies and cartels and research on lock-in models, positive
feedback loops, and social networks to explore her theory of persistent racial
inequality); Barnes, supra note 2, at 948-51 (my own use of sociolegal research on
legal consciousness as a comparator); Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice:
Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
3211, 3213 (2015) (strategically employing distributional analysis in service to
progressive criminal law scholarship); L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence:
Lessons from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2962 (2015) (using social
cognition theories related to unconscious bias, stereotype threat, and masculinity threat
to inform analysis of police behavior during stops).
98. In previous articles, co-authors and I heavily relied on empirical studies as
critical to the theses advanced. See Mario L. Barnes & Robert S. Chang, Analyzing
Stops, Citations, and Searches in Washington and Beyond, 35 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 673,
675 (2012) (analyzing seven years of police auto stop data compiled by the Washington
State Police); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On
Being "Regarded As" Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and
Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1283, 1289-90 (heavily relying on resume studies
conducted by Bertrand and Mullainathan to propose a model for rectifying proxy
discrimination with employment discrimination); Barnes, supra note 60, at 3189-96
(analyzing all empirical studies of stand your ground laws available at the time to
address the deterrence value and racial consequences of the statutes).
99. Barnes, supra note 60, at 3186 n.33 (listing all of my scholarship in which
social science studies were considered).
100. Glenn Adams & Phia S. Salter, A Critical Race Psychology Is Not Yet
Born, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1355, 1360 (2011). For consideration of these and other
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It is for this reason that the training of solo cross-disciplinarians and
partnerships with social scientists in fruitful collaborations present
somewhat safer options. The potential weakness posed by empirical
diviners, however, should be regarded as no greater than that which
arises for theory engagers. While the e-CRT work accomplished by
those in the former category may produce work that insufficiently
appreciates or misapplies research findings, work conducted by those in
the latter may create studies that are ill-attentive to how race is actually
experienced."' If e-CRT is to stand as a true joining of equals,
problems resulting from both types of fallacy should be regarded as
similarly problematic.
B. Giving Space to Initial Formations but with a Watchful Eye
A number of significant questions remain about how e-CRT work
is or should be "done." First and foremost, there remains a content
question. Ostensibly, there will be work that touches upon race and
employs some empirical grounding that scholars involved in the project
will not embrace as representative. Second, there are likely other
acceptable e-CRT manifestations and permutations.102 One relevant
category not discussed more explicitly involves social scientists who are
not necessarily steeped in CRT literatures but who nonetheless include
thoughtful considerations of race within their work. Should this be
considered e-CRT? In a recent issue of the Law and Society Review, I
reviewed a wonderful book, Pulled Over, by University of Kansas
scholars, that looks at over two thousand police stops in the Kansas
challenges faced by those doing this form of e-CRT, see infra notes 134-135 and
accompanying text.
101. See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY & RACISM IN THE
PosT-CIvIL RIGHTS ERA 9 (2001) (noting that for some who study race, "lack of a
sophisticated understanding of how racism operates in the contemporary United States"
and an overzealous commitment to methods may prevent a researcher from "correctly
assessing the status of racial minorities."). It would seem that the dangers of
misinterpretation for both theory engagers and empirical diviners could be mitigated by
e-CRT serving as a body to facilitate the review and exchange of work between critical
scholars and social scientists.
102. These categories are designed to represent loose and shifting formations.
Some work even involves parts of multiple categories. For example, recent work done
by Indiana Law Professor Victor Quintanilla-previously used as an example of a solo
cross-disciplinarian-is co-authored with a psychologist (a fruitful collaboration) and
involves analysis not of original studies but of morality research conducted by others
(empirical divining). See Victor D. Quintanilla & Cheryl R. Kaiser, The Same-Actor
Inference of Nondiscrimination: Moral Credentialing and the Psychological and Legal
Licensing of Bias, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2016).
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City metropolitan area.10 This thoughtful exploration of racial profiling
using multiple methods made a number of helpful findings. It noted that
race mattered most in investigatory rather than public safety stops.'"
Looking at multiple factors for stops, the authors found that Blacks
were most likely to be stopped, especially young, black men driving
either recent model foreign luxury cars or older model domestic luxury
brands in neighborhoods where they were presumed "out of place.""o'
Blacks were also treated more punitively during stops, even when
controlling for socioeconomic class." Importantly, the researchers
conducted interviews with drivers who had been stopped, and these
narratives depicted the starkly different and disrespectful ways black
men were treated during stops."o7 Again, while none of the co-authors
are avowed critical race scholars,os the project is especially sensitive to
interactive effects of variables, including race of the driver.
Although it does not prominently engage CRT proper, is Pulled
Over still e-CRT work? If so, why? What are the hallmarks and
standards necessary to be included?1" As suggested above, even if a
103. CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE
AND CITIZENSHIP 1, 11-12 (2014) (using both quantitative and qualitative studies of
multiple factors, including race, in an analysis of how race shapes police stops and
citizenship).
104. Id. at 52-56.
105. Id. at 69-71.
106. Id. at 102.
107. Id. at 84-92.
108. The scholars are in the political science department and School of Public
Affairs and Administration at the University of Kansas. While the scholars do not use
CRT as a primary lens within the book, they do mention the significance of CRT and
e-CRT in their methods section. See id. at 21 n.73 (citing the work on narrative by
critical scholars Mario Barnes and Richard Delgado); see also id. at 23 n.81 (citing to
the work of e-CRT founders Laura G6mez and Osagie Obasogie on the dangers of
treating race in black-white binary terms).
109. On this question, consider the fact that quite of a bit of research in
criminology and sociology includes questions of race without specifically engaging
CRT. Even without a particular tie to CRT, it is likely that some of this research would
be embraced by e-CRT. See, e.g., VICTOR M. RIos, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF
BLACK AND LATINO Boys (2011); MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING
AMERICAN DILEMMA (2011); Jennifer Carlson, The Equalizer? Crime, Vulnerability,
and Gender in Pro-Gun Discourse, 9 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 59 (2014) (a
thought-provoking exploration of how crime control and the social construction of
crime not only produce racial disadvantage but also masculine privilege); Kathleen Daly
& Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, 22 CRIME & JUST. 201, 207 (1997)
(describing how criminal justice statistical data include an essentialist understanding of
racial/ethnic differences and often lack measures to gauge socioeconomic class); see
also Petersen & Ward, supra note 92; Ward, supra note 94. Also, while I consider The
Enigma of Diversity, BERREY, supra note 66, to include enough of an engagement with
critical theory to be included within e-CRT, others might find that it is no more or less
representative than Pulled Over, EPP ET AL., supra note 103. Whatever one thinks of
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commitment to CRT is indicated, shall there be limits on which
disciplines and methods are understood to belong to the enterprise?"o
While there are prescriptions from founding e-CRT scholars as to the
mutual respect that should be involved in e-CRT engagements, there
are no bright-line standards. As such, there is an argument to be made
that, even though no critical scholar was involved and the authors were
not themselves critical race scholars, Pulled Over should be considered
e-CRT or at least e-CRT-adjacent. Perhaps the most significant factor
to be considered in making this case is that the authors conclude that
the race bias performed in police stops is not due to individual racism
but instead to a group of "racially framed" institutional practices."
This crucial finding supports a central tenet of CRT related to
institutional bias,112 while nothing in the book raises skepticism with
regard to its treatment of race.
As the Pulled Over example demonstrates, the categories of e-CRT
knowledge production described herein are only partially representative
of an enterprise that is evolving. There are likely to be other
formations, but how-other than through the creation of work explicitly
acknowledged by the e-CRT community as belonging to the tradition-
will inclusion or representativeness be measured? The above described
categories strike me as unobjectionable. Who, however, will vet or
evaluate more troubling formations or projects? By what standards will
they be measured? Even if future working groups or other interested
parties create no formal framework, at some point, there will be a need
to at least acknowledge informal understandings. Currently, there have
been no insurmountably critical points of tension among scholars within
e-CRT because the content and collaborations of e-CRT have been
loose and inclusive. In the future, however, tensions may arise when
calls for content analysis or methodological coherence are brought to
the fore."' There may also be breaks over how race should be studied
or which scholars' visions of the project should occupy the center."4 At
the unresolved question of what constitutes e-CRT, both projects include the kind of
nuanced consideration of race at the heart of the call for e-CRT's formation.
110. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
111. EPPET AL., supra note 103, at 12.
112. Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18, at 157-58.
113. We saw just such a contested moment in the development of LatCrit. See
Keith Aoki & Kevin Johnson, An Assessment of LatCrit Theory Ten Years After, 83
IND. L.J. 1151, 1157-59, 1195 (2008). For a response to this critique, see Montoya &
Valdes, supra note 54, at 1200-01, 1229.
114. See, e.g., Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the
Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and
Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DuKE L.J. 397, 398 (noting how discussions of racism
can become obscured in environments where well-meaning individuals use analogy to
place other forms of discrimination at the center.of the dialogue); Athena D. Mutua,
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this point, the wisest course of action would be to provide e-CRT time
and space to continue to evolve, with the understanding that both hard
questions and hard-fought compromises may be a part of the
movement's future.
III. CHALLENGES
While the projects and formations that have been part of laying the
e-CRT foundation thus far have been varied, it would be naive to
imagine this work has produced no concerns. As an enterprise built at
the cross-section of a progressive scholarly tradition and social science
disciplines, it is only logical that disputes over e-CRT, however small,
would develop on both sides of the intersection. I next consider a range
of concerns that are broadly evocative of critical and sociolegal
perspectives. Alongside these concerns, I add my own comments on the
potential for certain points of difference to destabilize the project. Much
like the categories of doing e-CRT work considered above, these
potential challenges should be regarded as initial, partial, and
contingent concerns for a dynamic and still-forming movement.
A. Critical Commentaries
Among critical scholars, in a recent article, UCLA Law Professor
Devon Carbado and USC Law Professor Daria Roithmayr have taken
the lead in turning a searching eye toward assessing a potential
marriage between CRT and social sciences."' In particular, they argue
that broadly embracing social science methods poses some risks for
CRT. First, Carbado and Roithmayr argue that critical scholars have
significantly challenged claims to neutrality and objectivity that may be
undermined by relying on research methods or findings."6 Second,
Shifting Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the Black/White
Paradigm, 53 U. MLAM L. REv. 1177, 1177, 1179, 1216-17 (1999) (discussing how to
maintain progressive scholarly movements composed of disparate interests).
115. Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18. First, the authors note that
commentators have asserted, "[F]oundational principles of social science are potentially
at odds with foundational principles of CRT." Id. at 155 (citation omitted). The
authors, however, focus most of their attention on quantitative social science
methodologies. Id. at 150.
116. Id. at 156-57. In particular, critical scholars have argued about the
differences resulting from using "first-person" versus "third-person" observations
about the world. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Angela P. Harris & Francisco Valdes, Subject
Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2435, 2436-37 (2003) ("The questions presented by
scientific observation are not dependent on who is doing the observing. For critical race
theory, however . . . questions, perceptions, and priorities change drastically in the
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scholars of CRT have concerned themselves with legal frameworks and
how they can tend to instantiate disadvantage. The legal frameworks of
intentional discrimination and colorblindness are provided as examples
of ostensibly neutral considerations within equal protection analysis,
which actually serve the ends of bias."' According to Carbado and
Roithmayr, "social science is subject to a similar framework critique,"
which has resulted historically in "social science and its classifications .
. . serv[ing] the ideology of white supremacy and the political project
of racial segregation and exclusion."" Finally, a schism may exist
between CRT's focus on racial disparities being produced through
structural inequality and models within social science that focus more
on individual behavior as the primary source of racial bias."'
As members of past e-CRT working groups, Carbado's and
Roithmayr's experiences within these spaces inform their very helpful
insights into the current status of the project. Other critiques of CRT
reaching out to other disciplines, including my own, predated or were
simultaneous to the rise of e-CRT. For example, in the year the first
e-CRT working group met, UCLA Law Dean Emerita Rachel Moran
commented on the disconnect between CRT and the social sciences.120
Specifically, she noted, that critical scholars "pointedly rejected social
scientists' claims to objectivity and neutrality, equating their
methodology with a positivism that did little more than reinforce the
status quo."12 ' This rejection is premised upon beliefs about racel12 that
"reduce[] the relevance of empirical inquiry by evoking absolutes on
each side."1 23 In an earlier piece exploring the possibility of greater
synergies between CRT and law and economics, in particular, Devon
realm of subordination as we shift in perspective from observer to observed" (citation
omitted)).
117. Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18, at 157.
118. Id. at 158.
119. Id. at 159.
120. Rachel F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race,
Social Science, and the Law, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 515, 522 (2010).
121. Id. at 522 (citation omitted).
122. She describes those beliefs as a "dialectic on race" composed of the
following commitments:
The Critical Race Theory (CRT) movement in turn has adopted an
explicitly oppositionalist stance, treating pervasive racism and intractable
racial self-interest as foundational assumptions. CRT treats these postulates
as givens, in part because of its self-consciously political project to resist
racism. Rather than subject these claims to empirical verification, critical
race scholars have made heavy use of narrative, a technique that relies on
first-person accounts to reveal the victim's perspective.
Id. at 545-46 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 546.
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Carbado and Mitu Gulati, criticized the limitations of both
movements.12 4 The authors raised as a primary criticism, an issue they
later addressed in their own work, that "CRT often ignores the racial
productivity of the 'choices' people of color make about how to present
themselves as racialized persons."2
As for my own concerns, they too suggest that the e-CRT project
still has some potential issues to work through. First, even as I called,
in 2006, for narrative to be a point of synergy between CRT and the
sociolegal scholarship, I also recognized there were dangers attendant
in uncritically adopting methods across disciplines. This is especially
true for narrative methodology, which has occupied a central locality in
CRT discourses.126 In 2010, in a response I wrote to Richard Lempert's
Law and Society presidential address, I identified such an issue.
Professor Lempert included four personal stories in his speech that
discussed race in ways that could be viewed as somewhat problematic
from a CRT perspective.127 Moreover, his choice to deploy narrative-
which I indicated has been strongly criticized when used by critical
124. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 61. For example, the authors criticized law
and economics for ignoring Laura G6mez's warning regarding treating race as an
independent variable and the "failure of its proponents to conceptualize racial
discrimination in the workplace as a dialectical process within which race both shapes,
and is shaped by, workplace culture." Id. at 1758-59. CRT was similarly criticized, in
part, for paying "little attention to the workplace as a site of racial construction." Id. at
1759. Of note, the authors give credit to an earlier article for espousing a commonality
between CRT and law and economics. Id. at 1761 (citing Edward L. Rubin, The New
Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996)).
125. Id. at 1760. The authors addressed the construction of race in the
workplace through various modes of identity performance in a series of articles that are
now published as a book. DEVON W. CARBADO & Mrru GULATI, ACTING WHITE?
RETHINKING RACE IN "POST-RACIAL" AMERICA (2013). Interestingly, at least one of the
authors has described Acting White as merging CRT and work from the social sciences.
See Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18, at 162 (The book is described as using
"organizational theory, sociology, economics, and social psychology to argue that
racial judgments are based in part on how black a person is perceived to be.").
126. OBASOGIE, supra note 27, at 197 ("Critical Race Theory has also been
distinguished by its methodological contribution of telling stories-those that are
fictitious, drawn from personal experiences, or otherwise-as a way to make broader
claims about the nature of race and racism in contemporary society."); Leslie Espinoza
& Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby - LatCrit Theory and the
Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1630-32 (1997); Rachel Moran, The
Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365, 2378-79 (2003); Moran,
supra note 120, at 546. But see Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18, at 161
("Storytelling is not necessarily an essential component of CRT (although some CRT
scholars would disagree on this point)." (citation omitted)).
127. Barnes, supra note 20, at 475-79.
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scholarsl28-was not challenged by other reviewers.129 My critique
hence suggested that, just as mastering social science methods requires
work by critical scholars, social scientists should study both the history
and central premises of CRT'30 prior to engaging in race discourses.131
Second, beyond problems related to the use of specific methods,
there are possibilities for disagreements to arise. Moving forward,
adopting standards for collaborative work may ultimately result in
stand-offs where decisions will have to be made about how to handle
data or research results that do not support CRT theories or tenets. As
the studies of intersectionality presented above suggest, there have been
no significant controversies of this type. Not until projects experience a
substantial disjuncture between theory and data will better information
exist on whether the project is sustainable.13 2 A conflict of this type
strikes me as representing more than a minor stumbling block. Despite
what often should be considered as measured findings,' empirical
research and outcomes are valorized and viewed as nearly infallible by
some. This is true even though data are not self-interpreting.134 It is
difficult to surmise, then, whether researchers would be open to having
128. See id. at 472; see also Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18, at 161
(surmising, "[T]he critique of CRT's use of storytelling remains common. . . Indeed,
it often anchors the claim that CRT is intellectually deficient, if not bankrupt.").
129. Ralph Richard Banks, Commentary on Professor Lempert's Presidential
Address, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 463 (2010); Jeannine Bell, The Personal, the Political,
and Race, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 487 (2010); Kitty Calavita, The Struggle for Racial
Justice: The Personal, the Political, and ... the Economic, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 495
(2010); Malcolm M. Feeley, The Personal and the Professional: Assessing the
Ambivalent Commitment o Racial Justice in the United States, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
503 (2010).
130. See Barnes, supra note 20, at 472-73.
131. Id.
132. For example, had Rachel Kahn Best et al., determined that there was no
empirical proof of the costs of intersectionality to employment discrimination claims, it
is doubtful that feminist and critical scholars would have abandoned the theory of
intersectionality. Some such scholars, however, likely would have abandoned e-CRT.
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
133. See Gary Gutting, What Do Scientific Studies Show?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
25, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/what-do-
scientific-studies-show/.
134. CRT co-founder Richard Delgado made this very point in his foreword to
a collection of Critical Race Realism writings. Richard Delgado, Foreword to CRITICAL
RACE REALIsM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND LAW, supra note 51, at xi,
xii ("Scientific findings . . . rarely speak for themselves; they require an act of
interpretation."); see also Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 18, at 158-59 (suggesting
that social science is susceptible to an "interpretation of facts critique"-a critique that
"focuses on the way in which the language and theoretical method used to frame an
inquiry shape not just the observer's interpretation of facts but also what the observer
perceives to be a fact in the first place."); infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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their study designs and results challenged based on what critical
scholars believe they know about themselves and the world (however
anecdotal). Additionally, even critical scholars generally inclined to
trust in the robustness of empirical findings are likely to maintain some
skepticism of research methods and outcomes based on a history where
scientific research, old and new, has been a tool for propping up racist
treatment and ideas.135
B. The Sociolegal Critique
Critical scholars are not the only ones to have raised issues about
collaborating across disciplines. In their foreword to the 2005 "New
Legal Realism Symposium" in the Wisconsin Law Review, a group of
scholars cautioned that it was imprudent to think easy connections could
be maintained across vastly different fields.'" Speaking both of
collaborative projects among social sciences and between social
sciences and the law, they claimed parties must remain mindful that
"there are important differences of epistemology, methods, operating
assumptions and overall goals" that must be addressed.'
Some helpful insights can also be found in the work of scholars
who are critics of empirical methods more generally. For example, in
the introduction to Tukufu Zuberi's and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva's edited
collection White Logic, White Methods, the editors assert that white
ideological methodology has tainted almost all aspects of social science
research.' Consistent with the collection's theme, they define white
logic as "a context in which White supremacy has defined the
techniques and process of reasoning about social facts"' and white
methods as "practical tools used to manufacture empirical data and
analysis to support the racial stratification in society."' The authors
are also critical of their own discipline, sociology, finding that
135. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: How SCIENCE,
POLITICS, AND BIG BusINEss RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 26-49
(2011); HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT passim (2006); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva & Tukufu Zuberi, Introduction to
WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY 3, 16 (Tukufu Zuberi &
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008) ("[T]he physical and social sciences have actively
aided in the development of racial stratification as a scientifically legitimate and socially
acceptable concept.").
136. Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is Time for a New Legal Realism?,
2005 Wis. L. REv. 335, 336, 363.
137. Id. at 336.
138. Bonilla-Silva & Zuberi, supra note 135, at 15-20.
139. Id. at 17.
140. Id. at 18.
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because the social sciences were part of what Foucault labeled
"the sciences of Man," the knowledge they produced was
implicated in the "matrix of domination" (the race, class,
gender, and sexual order of things) and fundamentally geared
toward "social control." Hence, from the beginning,
sociology-as all the social sciences-produced knowledge
about "Others" (workers, people of color, gays and lesbians,
etc.) as deviants .... 141
The authors are not completely convinced that the problem of
racialized methods is fatal. In fact, they seem to be arguing for
attention being paid to context, as they assert that "all scientific
endeavors transpire in a world where race, gender, and class are
important not only as subjects for investigation, but as structural factors
that partly shape researchers and their scientific gaze."142 They,
however, do call for a specific intervention, which they describe as a
"deracialization of our research methods."1 43  Deracialization is
described as a social act involving a "modification of social reality"
that "privileges the human over the racialized individual."'" Embracing
deracialization is one method for undermining the racial knowledge
derived of white methods, but the ultimate goal is to "decolonize our
own sociological imagination; to unlearn received truths about race,
'racial relations,' and race research."'45 Their intervention, however,
also still calls for us to be mindful of our potential impact as
researchers:
The misuse of methods in the study of race demands our
attention. This issue needs deliberate conscious study; we
must analyze and provide answers. By recognizing that the
researcher is as important as what they study we enhance our
ability to contribute to an understanding of society."
Tukufu Zuberi, separately, has spoken specifically to the link
between critical theories and social science.'47 He believes a great
141. Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Telling the Real Tale of the
Hunt: Toward a Race Conscious Sociology of Racial Stratification, in WHITE LOGIC,
WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY, supra note 135, at 329, 330 (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted).
142. Bonilla-Silva & Zuberi, supra note 135, at 18.
143. Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva, supra note 141, at 336.
144. Id. at 337.
145. Id. at 338 (citation omitted).
146. Bonilla-Silva & Zuberi, supra note 135, at 12.
147. Tukufu Zuberi, Critical Race Theory of Society, 43 CONN. L. REv. 1573,
1575 (2011) (describing his project as "consider[ing] the tradition of critical theories of
473
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
number of social scientists conduct their research without seriously
considering the implications of race. The resulting studies, then, "often
only produce statistics of racial differences, which are used to justify
continued racial stratification and denying the humanity of
non-Whites."'" He, however, does not suggest that that there is no
hope to rectify this situation. Rather, he posits the need for "[c]ritical
social scientists on racial matters [to] provide data, arguments,
counter-narratives, and all sorts of intellectual ammunition against
dominant representations of racial groups and racial inequality." 49 This
goal is obviously consistent with e-CRT. Whether it can be
accomplished remains to be seen.
Finally, some of the risks for e-CRT are related to dangers that
exist for anyone conducting or reviewing empirical data with or without
a racial component. Sometimes the phenomenon or processes being
studied are difficult to measure. For example, D.C. Circuit Judge and
New York University Law Professor Harry T. Edwards has questioned
the accuracy and efficacy of empirical studies of the effects of
extralegal factors on certain judicial decisions."o Given the messiness
of race, this may also be true for some e-CRT studies. Additionally, in
a recent comment about a paper he and Adam Chilton will publish in
the Journal of Legal Studies, Omri Ben-Shahar claimed that testing
legal ideas by looking at data is a welcome growing trend in legal
scholarship, but it is also known to carry risks of according authority to
dubious and poorly tested claims."' Many consumers of published
race in the social sciences, and how this tradition might be related to the CRT
movement that developed in the law").
148. See id. at 1580 (citing TUKUFU ZUBERI, THICKER THAN BLOOD: How
RACIAL STATISTICS LIE 106 (2001)).
149. Id. at 1589. He also calls for the social sciences to be more open to
critical perspectives:
More recently, scholars have begun to undermine the scientific claims of
the social sciences generally by engaging in both the methodological and
theoretical dimensions of the disciplines. This critique is also reflected in
the theoretical work represented by stratification economics, liberation
sociology, Black feminist thought, racial critical theory, and racial
formation. These perspectives share a view that modem society must be
understood in a broader context than that established by the acceptance of
traditional explanations.
Id. at 1584-85 (footnotes omitted).
150. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DuKE
L.J. 1895, 1905-10 (2009).
151. The comments were posted as introductory remarks to a paper abstract on
a popular legal scholarship blog at Ben-Shabar's request. See Brian Leiter, Credibility
of Empirical Legal Scholarship, BRIAN LEITER's L. SCH. REP. (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2015/10/credibility-of-empirical-legal-
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empirical scholarship are not adequately trained in empirical sciences to
read the reported results critically-results that often pass only lax peer
review (if any at all). If these researchers are correct, then their claims
are relevant to e-CRT, as well. The concern about law-trained scholars
(i.e., empirical diviners) using social science in their work is that they
may lack the sophistication to understand it fully. Taken to its logical
conclusion, the Ben-Shahar and Chilton description of empirical work,
if accurate, may support a proposition that no e-CRT work should be
conducted without someone trained in methods being a part of the
collaboration.
CONCLUSION
Historically, "[wiomen and people of color might be the
objects of study, " but they were "[not] part of the
mainstream of the social sciences. " As marginalized
scholars, women and people of color often engaged the
academy as agents of change. They were concerned with
challenging the existing hierarchies and with transforming
the perspectives of the social scientists themselves. I make
this point so that we recognize that CRT existed before it
was named.
-Tukufu Zuberi152
Before there was e-CRT, there was CRT. Like CRT, the creation
of e-CRT was facilitated through a series of meetings where values,
commitments, and goals for the enterprise were discussed and made a
part of the movement's scholarship. As a function of these meetings
and resulting scholarship specifically tied to the conversations that took
place, e-CRT now formally exists. Its tenets, however, have not been
fully articulated and there are no processes currently in place to
pronounce which work is sufficiently representative. Moreover, there
has been no decision as to whether there should be an entity that polices
the boundaries of this growing movement or e-CRT should just be
scholarship.html. The paper to which he is referring, titled "'Best Practices' in the
Design of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test," is proffered as an attempt to
improve the credibility of empirical legal research. Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam Chilton,
"Best Practices" in the Design of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test (Oct. 5,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2670115.
152. Zuberi, supra note 147, at 1577 (alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Tukufu Zuberi, Sociology and the African Diaspora Experience, in A
COMPANION TO AFRicAN-AMERicAN STUDIEs 246, 246 (Lewis R. Gordon & Jane Anna
Gordon eds., 2006)).
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
satisfied to be a movement that provides a "big tent.""' At this time,
all that can be said is that the movement and resulting scholarship
persists. At some point, however, conflicts related to content and
collaboration will materialize. When there are disagreements, the
viability of e-CRT will turn on twin concepts of trust and respect. Not
until scholars across discipline-specific aisles respect each other's
commitments and trust each other's motivations and methods will
e-CRT reach stability. Until that stasis occurs, e-CRT may simply be
another name for CRT with an occasional dalliance into social science.
My hope, however, is that the movement, the methods used, and the
work produced grow and become more sophisticated. The best hope for
the movement to thrive is to construct what it means to "do" e-CRT as
more open than insular, more contextual than fixed, and more
collaborative than separate.
Despite any concerns about the project's efficacy, and consistent
with the Tukufu Zuberi's statement above,15 4 even without further
working groups or adoption of any precise governing standards, what
we now call e-CRT is likely to continue to exist because it always
existed in some form, even before it was so named. There has always
been interdisciplinary exchange between legal scholars and scholars
from other disciplines, which resulted in projects thoughtfully
considering race. The goal of e-CRT is to shape those interdisciplinary
engagements in a manner that values the insights of CRT and the
benefits to be gained from leveraging social science methods. If
supportive scholars can do so in a way that honors shared goals and
involves sensitivity to, and mutual respect for, differences, the work
that comes out of e-CRT may go a long way toward altering how race
is understood within this country's intellectual, political, and social
imagination.
153. This was, according to CRT co-founder Kimberl6 Crenshaw, a question
that also animated debates among CRT's organizers. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw,
The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or "A Foot in a Closing Door," 49 UCLA L.
REv. 1343, 1362-63 (2002) ("Some participants framed the issue as a conflict over
whether CRT would have a theoretical 'line' or whether as a safe space, it was a big
tent open to all comers.").
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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